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Abstract
We consider cannibalization in a duopoly model in which rms with di¤erent
costs supply two vertically di¤erentiated products in the same market. We nd
that an increase in the di¤erence in quality between the two goods or a decrease
in the marginal cost of the high-quality goods leads to cannibalization, such that
the high-quality goods keep out the low-quality goods from the market. We show
that, in equilibrium, cannibalization a¤ects the product line of rms. As a result,
an ine¢ cient rm may earn more than the e¢ cient rm. If the di¤erence in the
quality of the two goods is small enough, an increase in the production costs of the
ine¢ cient rm improves social welfare.
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1 Introduction
In a real economy, there are oligopolistic markets in which rms produce and sell multiple
products that are vertically di¤erentiated within the same market. For example, GM sells
the Chevrolet Cruze and GMC Sierra PU, and Toyota sells the Camry, Corolla Matrix,
and Prius the hybrid car in the same segment of the car market. Hyundai also sells
the Elantra and Hybrid Sonata in the same segment of the US car market. As another
example, Apple sells the iPad Mini and the larger iPad in the tablet market. Similarly,
Samsung sells the Galaxy Note and the Galaxy Tab, both in a smaller and larger variety.1
Since consumers believe that the quality of the rmstechnology di¤ers, each consumer
places a di¤erent value on the high-quality good of each rm. Thus, these markets are
horizontally as well as vertically di¤erentiated. In such markets, there are more cases
of cannibalization.2 Cannibalization occurs when a rm reduces the sales of one of its
products by introducing a similar, competing product in the same market.
In this study, cannibalization is a business strategy characterized by a di¤erence in
the quality of vertically di¤erentiated goods and cost e¢ ciency. We also explore how
cannibalization a¤ects the protability of rms in equilibrium.
In the existing literature on vertical product di¤erentiation, the quality of goods that
rms produce is treated as an endogenous variable. For example, in Bonanno (1986)
and Motta (1993), rms initially choose a quality level and then compete in Cournot
or Bertrand fashion in an oligopolistic market. Valletti (2000) considered a two-stage
duopoly game in which rms rst choose the quality of their goods, and then compete
1See Samsungs Brand Cannibalization, http://www.indianprice.com/mobiles/articles/15-
samsungs-brand-cannibalization.html.
2Actually, there have been many reports that the iPad Mini is cannibalizing sales of the larger iPad.
See, for example, Seward (2013), Yes, the iPad Mini is cannibalizing sales of larger iPad.
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in terms of the quantity they supply. Then, he explored the e¤ect of a minimum quality
standard regulation on the Cournot equilibrium he derived. However, these studies do
not consider rms that sell multiple products in the same market that are di¤erentiated
in terms of quality (vertically). In dealing with cannibalization in such a market, our
model needs to allow for a multi-product rm (MPF) that di¤ers in terms of its features
or characteristics. Few previous studies address an oligopolistic market with such MPFs,
although Johnson and Myatt (2003) are a notable exception.3
According to Johnson and Myatt (2003), rms that sell multiple quality-di¤erentiated
products frequently change their product lines when a competitor enters the market. They
explain the common strategies of using ghting brandsand pruningproduct lines.
That is, they endogenized not only the quality level of each good, but also the number
of goods that each rm supplied in the market.
In the positive analysis literature that refers to cannibalization, Igami and Yang (2013)
recently investigated how cannibalization and preemption a¤ect new entries and the evo-
lution of market structure. They developed a dynamic entry model for a multi-product
oligopoly based on a panel dataset of hamburger shops in Canada. According to their
results, cannibalization is the main determinant of both prot and entry.
For the purpose of our analysis, both the quality level and the number of di¤erentiated
goods supplied by each rm are given, unlike in preceding studies. In addition, we do
not consider new entries to the market in our model. In our setting, both rms produce
and supply two kinds of vertically di¤erentiated goods in a market. This setting can
provide a benchmark against which to extend our analysis to a model in which each
rm strategically chooses whether to launch a new vertically di¤erentiated product into
a market in which it already competes with its rival with an existing product. In typical
3For the sake of simplicity, we focus on a duopoly model.
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existing models of horizontal or vertical product di¤erentiation, each rm produces only
one kind of good, given exogenously, which di¤ers from that of its rival.
Ellison (2005), another study closely related to ours, analyzed a market in which
each rm sells a high-end and low-end version of the same product. Although each rm
produces two di¤erentiated goods, the two goods are sold in di¤erent markets, each with
di¤erent types of consumers.4 In contrast, our study provides a model in which both
rms produce two vertically di¤erentiated products. To explore the relationship between
the di¤erence in quality of the goods and cannibalization, we consider a duopoly with
asymmetric marginal costs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the
model and derive a duopoly equilibrium with two vertically di¤erentiated products in
a market. Furthermore, we explore the relationship among the di¤erence of quality
of goods, cost asymmetry, and cannibalization by using comparative statistics of the
equilibrium output. In section 3, we conduct a welfare analysis of the duopoly model
that we analyze in section 2. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper and o¤ers suggestions
for possible future research.
2 The Model and the Derivation of an Equilibrium
Suppose that there are two rms, (i = 1; 2), each producing two goods (good H and
good L) that di¤er in terms of quality, where 1; 2 imply rm 1 and rm 2 in the duopoly
case, respectively. Let VH and VL denote the quality level of the two goods. Then,
the maximum amount consumers are willing to pay for each good is assumed to be
VH > VL > 0. Further, we assume VH = (1 + )VL, where  represents the di¤erence
4His model combines vertical di¤erentiation (two distinct qualities) and horizontal di¤erentiation (two
rms located at distinct points in a linear city).
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in quality between the two goods, and we normalize the quality of the low-quality good
as VL = 1, for simplicity. Good (= H;L) is assumed to be homogeneous for any
consumer. Moreover, suppose that each rm has constant returns to scale and that
ciH > ciL = cjL = cL, where ci is the marginal cost of rm i and  is the average cost of
the good. This implies that a high-quality good incurs a higher cost of production than
a low-quality good.5 Without loss of generality, we also assume that cL = 0. Under these
assumptions, each rms prot is dened in the following manner:
i = (piH   ciH)qiH + piLqiL i = 1; 2; (1)
where pi is the price of good  sold by rm i, and qi is the rms output. Each rm
chooses the quantity to supply that maximizes this prot function in Cournot fashion.
Next, we describe the consumersbehavior in our model.
Following the standard specication in the literature, for example, Katz and Shapiro
(1985), we assume that there is a continuum of consumers characterized by a taste pa-
rameter, , which is uniformly distributed between  1 and r > 0, with density 1. We
further assume that a consumer of type  2 ( 1; r];for r > 0, obtains a net surplus from
one unit of good  from rm i at price pi. Thus, the utility (net benet) of consumer 
who buys good  (= H;L) from rm i (= 1; 2) is given by
Ui() = V   pi i =; 1; 2  = H;L: (2)
Each consumer decides to buy either nothing or one unit of good  from rm i to maximize
his/her surplus.
5For the symmetric costs version of our analysis, see Kitamura ans Shinkai (2013) in details.
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Before deriving the inverse demand of each good, we present three further assumptions
about the consumers in our model.
[Assumption 1] There exists a consumer, ^i 2 ( 1; r]; (r > 0), who is indi¤erent
between the two goods of the same rm; that is,
UiH(^i) = UiL(^i) > 0; i = 1; 2. (3)
[Assumption 2] There always exists a consumer, iL; i = 1; 2;, who is indi¤erent
between purchasing good L and purchasing nothing in the duopoly.
To derive a duopoly equilibrium, we need one other key assumption.
[Assumption 3] In the duopoly, for an arbitrary type- consumer,
U1() = U2();  = H;L: (4)
This last assumption implies that the net surplus of consumer  must be the same
whether buying a good produced by rm 1 or a good produced by rm 2, as long as the
two rms produce the same quality of good  and have positive sales.
From these assumptions, the inverse demand functions are obtained in the following
manner: 8>><>>:
pH = (1 + )(r  QH) QL
pL = r  QH  QL:
(5)
To maximize prot function (1), each rm determines the quantity of its goods, qiH and
qiL, in the following manner:
max
qiH ;qiL
i:
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Here, we set c2H > c1H > ciL = 0, which means that rm 1 is more e¢ cient than rm 2.
The rst-order conditions for prot maximization are as follows:
 (1 + )q1H + (1 + )(r  QH) QL   c1H   q1L = 0
 (1 + )q2H + (1 + )(r  QH) QL   c2H   q2L = 0
 q1H + r  QH  QL   q1L = 0
 q2H + r  QH  QL   q2L = 0.
Solving this system, we obtain the following Nash equilibrium quantities:
8>><>>:
q1H =
r
3
  2c1H c2H
3
; q1L =
2c1H c2H
3
q2H =
r
3
  2c2H c1H
3
; q2L =
2c2H c1H
3
:
(6)
For qiH and q

iL to be non-negative, we assume that
r  2c2H   c1H

and c1H  1
2
c2H : (7)
Hence, the total equilibrium output Q becomes constant:
Q = Q1 +Q

2 = Q

H +Q

L =
2
3
r. (8)
From (5) and (6), we obtain the following equilibrium prices of the goods:
pH =
(1 + )r + c1H + c2H
3
; pL =
r
3
. (9)
We also have the equilibrium prot of rm i:
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i =
(1 + )r2   (2ciH   cjH)r + (2ciH   cjH)2
9
; i = 1; 2 ; i 6= j (10)
From (6), we can easily establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Although the e¢ cient rm (rm 1) produces more of high-quality good
H than the ine¢ cient rm (rm 2), the ine¢ cient rm sells more of the low-quality good
L than does the e¢ cient rm. Furthermore, if the di¤erence in unit costs between the
two rms is su¢ ciently small (that is, if 2c1H = c2H), then the e¢ cient rm does not
produce the low-quality good.
Furthermore, the equilibrium outputs of (6) lead to the following condition for canni-
balization:
Corollary 1 In the duopoly equilibrium derived above, when the di¤erence in the
quality of the two goods,  or the marginal cost of high-quality good H of competi-
tor  cjH  increases (decreases), then cannibalization occurs such that high-quality
(low-quality) good H (L) keeps low-quality (high-quality) good L (H) out of the mar-
ket. However, if the marginal cost of high-quality good H of its own  ciH  increases
(decreases), then cannibalization occurs such that low-quality (high-quality) good L (H)
keeps high-quality (low-quality) good H (L) out of the market.
We illustrate the intuitive reasoning behind this corollary in relation to the recent
tablet PC market. When the di¤erence in the quality of the goods, , is su¢ ciently
large, or the marginal cost of high-quality good H of its rival, cjH , is high, the e¢ cient
rm, for example Apple, increases its output of the high-quality iPad. On the contrary,
if its rival, the ine¢ cient rm (for example, Samsung), can produce a high-quality tablet
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at a lower cost, cjH than Apple by R & D, or the di¤erence in the quality of the goods,
, becomes small, then Apple expands production of the lower-quality iPad Mini, which
cannibalizes the larger iPad. Then, Samsungs new tablet cannibalizes sales of its existing
10.1-inch tablet. However, unless the market has goods that are extremely di¤erentiated
or extremely similar in terms of quality, cannibalization does not occur.6
From (10), we can show that
@i
@
=
(r + 2ciH   cjH)(r   (2ciH   cjH))
92
> 0; i = 1; 2.
Furthermore, we also check the e¤ects of production costs on prot. From (10), we
obtain
@i
@ciH
> 0;
@i
@cjH
< 0 if
2c2H   c1H
r
  < 2(2ciH   cjH)
r
@i
@ciH
< 0;
@i
@cjH
> 0 if
2(2ciH   cjH)
r
< :
Proposition 2 When the di¤erence in the quality of the two goods increases, the
equilibrium prots of both rms increase. Furthermore, if (2c2H c1H)=r   < f2(2ciH 
cjH)g=r (f2(2ciH   cjH)g=r < ), an increase in the marginal cost of their own good H
or a decrease in the marginal cost of the competitors good H increases(reduces) the prot
of the rm.
6From the article in the web news,Samsungs Brand Cannibalization, Samsung occasionally im-
proves its products, which kills its existing product in the market. With the launch of the 10.1 inch
Galaxy Note (Samsungs latest tablet), it would most likely cannibalize sales of the existing 10.1 inch
tablet. However, Samsung does not mind, as the nest way to continue to exist in a competitive market
is to eradicate your own goods. See http://www.indianprice.com/mobiles/articles/15-samsungs-brand-
cannibalization.html
for more details.
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This proposition is counterintuitive. When the di¤erence in the quality between two
goods is su¢ ciently small, each rm produces more of the low-quality good than the
high-quality good, from equation (6), to avoid su¤ering from the positive marginal cost
of producing the high-quality good. Then, an increase in the unit cost of its own good
H or a decrease in the unit cost of its competitor helps this rm to produce more of the
low-quality good, and reduces the quantity of the high-quality good because of cannibal-
ization. In contrast, the rival rm sells more of the high-quality good, which has a positive
marginal cost. Thus, if the di¤erence in quality is su¢ ciently small, an increase in the
unit cost of good H or a decrease in the unit cost of the rival rm has a positive e¤ect
on its own prot. However, if the di¤erence in quality between the goods is su¢ ciently
large, we have the opposite conclusion.
Finally, we conrm the di¤erence in the prots of two rms, as follows:
2   1 = (c2H   c1H)(c1H + c2H   r)
3
(11)
Thus, from (7) and (11), we obtain
8>><>>:
1 < 2 if
2c2H c1H

 r < c1H+c2H

1 > 2 if
c1H+c2H

< r
: (12)
Recall that, from proposition 1, in equilibrium, the e¢ cient rm (Firm 1) always
produces more of high-quality good H than of low-quality good L. This means that,
for Firm 1, with its lower marginal cost, cannibalization occurs such that good H drives
good L out of the market. On the other hand, the ine¢ cient rm (Firm 2) produces
more of good L than of good H in equilibrium. Then, for Firm 2, with its higher
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marginal cost, cannibalization occurs such that good L drives good H out of the market.
However, from (6), the condition (2c2H   c1H)=  r < (c1H + c2H)= is identical to the
condition q1H < q

2L. That is, Firm 2 supplies more of good L than of good H, which
is sold by Firm 1. Furthermore, this condition also implies that q2H < q

1L < q

1H < q

2L.
Therefore, the cannibalization for Firm 2 is stronger than that for Firm 1. Consequently,
if r is small enough, Firm 2s prot surpasses that of Firm 1. In contrast, the inequality
(c1H + c2H)= < r is su¢ cient for the inequality q1L < q

2H < q

2L < q

1H . This means that
the degree of cannibalization for Firm 1 is larger than of Firm 2. In this case, Firm 1
earns more than Firm 2. In summary, in equilibrium, the rm whose goods cannibalize
more goods than its rivals goods do makes the greater prot.
Proposition 3 If consumers are distributed over the lower-valued (higher-valued)
range of the ratio of total marginal cost to the di¤erence in quality of two goods, then the
ine¢ cient rm earns more (less) prot than the e¢ cient rm does.
Note that Q = (2r)=3. When r is small, this implies that the total output at
equilibrium is small, from (8), and the prot of the ine¢ cient rm is larger than that of
the e¢ cient rm. Moreover, the higher the unit cost of good H of the e¢ cient rm (Firm
1), the larger the range of r that satises (2c2H   c1H)=  r < (c1H + c2H)=).
3 Welfare Analysis with Asymmetric Cost
In this section, we describe the comparative statistics of the social welfare in the equilib-
rium.
The social surplus in the equilibrium derived in the preceding section is given by
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W  =
Z ^
r
3
d +
Z r
^

(1 + )d   c1Hq1H   c2Hq2H (13)
=  
2
(^

)2   r
2
18
+
(1 + )r2
2
  c1Hq1H   c2Hq2H :
First, we explore the e¤ect of a change in unit cost on social welfare.
@W 
@ciH
=
11ciH   7cjH   4r
9
i = 1; 2:
Thus, 8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
@W 
@c1H
< 0
@W 
@c2H
> 0 if 2c2H c1H
r
  < 11c2H 7c1H
4r
@W 
@c2H
 0 if 11c2H 7c1H
4r
 
: (14)
Finally, we show that a change in the quality of the di¤erence between the two goods
always has a positive e¤ect on social welfare, as follows:
@W 
@
=
32r2 + 2(c1H + c2H)r   2c21H   2c22H + 8c1Hc2H
62
(15)
The sign of @W =@ is determined by the sign of the numerator of (15), where we
dene the numerator by W n (r), and W
n
 (r) is a quadratic in r. Evaluating W
n
 (r) at
r = (2c2H   c1H)=, we have
W n (
2c2H   c1H

) = 14c22H   c21H   2c1Hc2H > 0;
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and we see that the slope of W n (r) with respect to r is
@W n (r)
@r

r=
2c2H c1H

= 6(2c2H   c1H)2 + 2(c1H + c2H) > 0.
Then, we obtain
@W 

> 0. (16)
Thus, we show that an increase in the di¤erence between the two goods improves the
social welfare.
Proposition 4 The social surplus in equilibrium increases with
1. a decrease in the marginal cost of the e¢ cient rm for the high-quality good.
2. a decrease (increase) in the unit cost of the ine¢ cient rm when producing the
high-quality good if the di¤erence in quality is large (small) enough.
Moreover, an increase in the di¤erence between the two goods always increases the
social surplus in equilibrium.
The second part of this proposition is both interesting and counterintuitive, because
we may think that an increase in the production cost would lead to a decrease in social
welfare. However, a case exists in which social welfare improves if there is an increase
in the marginal cost of the high-quality good. The reason is that when the di¤erence
in quality is small, the increase in the marginal cost of the ine¢ cient rm leads to a
reduction in the total cost; (@Total cost)=@c2H < 0. This would have a positive e¤ect on
social welfare. On the other hand, the e¤ect on total consumer utility is always negative;
(@Total utility)=@c2H < 0. Thus, when the positive e¤ect of the former dominates the
13
negative e¤ect of the latter, the social surplus in equilibrium increases as the unit cost
to the ine¢ cient rm of producing good H increases and the di¤erence in quality is
su¢ ciently small.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we considered and proposed a duopoly model of cannibalization in which
two rms produce and sell two distinct products that are di¤erentiated horizontally as
well as vertically in the same market. Then, we showed that in the market equilibrium,
the e¢ cient rm produces more of the high-quality good and the ine¢ cient rm produces
more of the low-quality good.
Furthermore, we presented several comparative statistics and established that an in-
crease in the di¤erence in the quality of the two types of goods (i.e., a reduction in the
marginal cost of producing its own high-quality good) leads to cannibalization such that
the high-quality good drives the low-quality good out of the market. Similarly, a decrease
in the di¤erence in the quality of the two goods (i.e., an increase in the marginal cost
of the high-quality good of the competitor) causes cannibalization such that low-quality
good L drives high-quality good H out of the market. We also presented an intuitive
explanation for these comparative statistics. Interestingly, when the di¤erence in the
quality of the two goods is small, an increase in the marginal cost of a rms own good
H, or a decrease in the marginal cost of the competitors good H increases the prot of
the rm. Moreover, we showed that the ine¢ cient rm might earn more than the e¢ cient
rm.
Then, we conducted a welfare analysis and showed that an increase in the di¤erence
between the two goods and a decrease in the production costs of the high-quality good
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for the e¢ cient rm always increases social welfare. However, an increase in the marginal
cost of producing the high-quality good for the ine¢ cient rm does not always increase
social welfare. In particular, if the di¤erence in quality is su¢ ciently small, an increase in
the unit cost of the high-quality good for the ine¢ cient rm improves the social welfare.
Extensions to this study for future research are possible. For example, it would be
useful to analyze a case in which each rm can choose its level of quality as well as the
number of goods it produces. In addition, in this study, we do not consider a market
with network externality, which would be worth studying if we consider a market such as
the tablet PC industry described in section 2. Indeed, we are analyzing such a market in
another study.
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